

Discrete gaussian sampling for BKZ-reduced basis

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
9 April 2025

Discrete Gaussian Sampling


$$\rho_s(\mathbf{x}) = \exp\left(-\pi \frac{\|\mathbf{x}\|^2}{s^2}\right), \quad D_{\mathcal{L},s}(\mathbf{x}) = \frac{\rho_s(\mathbf{x})}{\rho_s(\mathcal{L})}, \quad \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n, s > 0.$$

Definition (Discrete Gaussian Distribution)


On lattice \mathcal{L} with **parameter** s : probability of $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{L}$ is $D_{\mathcal{L},s}(\mathbf{x})$.



$$\mathcal{L} = \mathbb{Z}, s = 7$$



$$\mathcal{L} = \mathbb{Z}^2, s = 7$$




$$\mathcal{L} = \mathbb{Z} \times 4\mathbb{Z}, s = 7$$

Discrete Gaussian Sampling (DGS)

- ▶ **input:** \mathcal{L} and s
- ▶ **output:** random $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{L}$ according to $D_{\mathcal{L},s}$.


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


Smoothing parameter

For $\varepsilon > 0$, $\eta_\varepsilon(\mathcal{L}) = \inf \left\{ s > 0 : \rho_{1/s}(\widehat{\mathcal{L}}) \leq 1 + \varepsilon \right\}$.

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- ▶ **Open problem:** $2^{O(n)}$ time, $2^{o(n)}$ space algorithm for $s = \eta_\varepsilon(\mathcal{L})$
- ▶ $s \leq \eta_\varepsilon(\mathcal{L})$ is useful for hard problems: LWE, SVP, BDD, ...

Discrete Gaussian Samplers

Some samplers depends on the input basis \mathbf{B} , or its Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization $\tilde{\mathbf{B}}$.

Reference	s	Complexity
[GPV08]	$\ \tilde{\mathbf{B}}\ \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log n})$	polynomial
[ACKS21]	$\eta_{1/3}(\mathcal{L})$	$2^{n/2}$
[WL19]*	$\frac{1}{\sqrt{\pi}} \ \tilde{\mathbf{B}}\ $	1.0039^n
	arbitrary	depends on \mathbf{B} and s

Limited choices for attacks:

- ▶ [GPV08]'s width is too large
- ▶ [ACKS21] is very expensive
- ▶ [WL19] *so far unused?*

*[BLP⁺13] seems to contain a similar result but it wasn't explicitly claimed.

Theorem ([WL19])

There is an algorithm that given a basis of $L \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ and any $s, \varepsilon > 0$, returns a sample according to some distribution ε -close to $\mathcal{D}_{L,s}$. It runs in time $\ln\left(\frac{1}{\varepsilon}\right) \cdot \frac{1}{\Delta} \cdot \text{poly}(n)$ where $\frac{1}{\Delta} = \frac{1}{\rho_s(L)} \prod_{i=1}^n \rho_{s/\|\tilde{\mathbf{b}}_i\|}(\mathbb{Z})$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{b}}_1, \dots, \tilde{\mathbf{b}}_d$ are the Gram-Schmidt vectors of the basis.

- ▶ no restriction on s
- ▶ complexity heavily depends on the shape of the basis
- ▶ complexity depends on $\rho_s(L)$ which is hard to estimate

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
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- ▶ no restriction on s
- ▶ complexity heavily depends on the shape of the basis
- ▶ complexity depends on $\rho_s(L)$ which is hard to estimate but

$$\frac{1}{\rho_s(L)} \prod_{i=1}^n \rho_{s/\|\tilde{\mathbf{b}}_i\|}(\mathbb{Z}) = \frac{1}{\rho_{1/s}(\hat{L})} \prod_{i=1}^n \rho_{\|\tilde{\mathbf{b}}_i\|/s}(\mathbb{Z}) \leq \prod_{i=1}^n \rho_{\|\tilde{\mathbf{b}}_i\|/s}(\mathbb{Z})$$

is tight when $s \geq \eta_\varepsilon(L)$ and $\varepsilon = O(1)$.

Tight upper bound on complexity ($s \geq \eta_{O(1)}(L)$): $C \leq \prod_{i=1}^n \rho_{\|\tilde{\mathbf{b}}_i\|/s}(\mathbb{Z})$




For a general basis:

$$C \leq (\rho_{\|\tilde{\mathbf{B}}\|/s}(\mathbb{Z}))^n \approx \left(\frac{\|\tilde{\mathbf{B}}\|}{s}\right)^n$$

quite pessimistic (for $\|\tilde{\mathbf{B}}\| \geq s$)

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Complexity is better if **many $\|\tilde{\mathbf{b}}_i\|$ are small**.

↪ **BKZ-reduced basis** have this feature

Blockwise Korkine-Zolotare (BKZ): lattice basis reduction algorithm

- ▶ Parameter: blocksize $\beta \in [1, n]$
- ▶ Complexity: exponential in β
- ▶ $\|\tilde{\mathbf{b}}_i\|$ decreases exponentially quickly

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Geometric Series Assumption (GSA)

For a BKZ- β reduced basis,

$$\|\tilde{\mathbf{b}}_i\| = \|\mathbf{b}_1\| H_\beta^{-2(i-1)}, \quad \|\mathbf{b}_1\| = H_\beta^{n-1} \text{vol}(L)^{1/n}$$

where $H_\beta := \left(\frac{\beta}{2\pi e} (\pi\beta)^{1/\beta} \right)^{1/2(\beta-1)}$.


- ▶ Reasonably accurate for $50 \leq \beta \ll n$

MCMC complexity for BKZ-reduced basis

- ▶ MCMC complexity:

$$C \leq \prod_{i=1}^n \rho_{\|\tilde{\mathbf{b}}_i\|/s}(\mathbb{Z})$$

- ▶ GSA: $\|\tilde{\mathbf{b}}_i\| = \|\mathbf{b}_1\| H_\beta^{-2(i-1)}$
- ▶ $\rho_s(\mathbb{Z}) \approx s$ for $s \geq 1$




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Very informally

For a BKZ- β reduced basis:

$$C \lesssim \left(\frac{\sqrt{\|\tilde{\mathbf{B}}\|}}{s} \right)^{k_\beta}$$

for some $k_\beta \in [1, n]$ which depends on β

\rightsquigarrow **Much better** than the generic bound $\left(\frac{\|\tilde{\mathbf{B}}\|}{s} \right)^n$.

What is in the paper?

Theorem

For a BKZ- β basis under the GSA,

$$\prod_{i=1}^n \rho_{\|\tilde{\mathbf{b}}_i\|/s}(\mathbb{Z}) \leq (\text{horrible formula})$$

Formula is *explicit* and *efficiently* (\approx constant time) *computable*

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
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
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
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- ▶ Comparison between BKZ and GSA for MCMC




- ▶ Comparison between GSA and (horrible formula)



Comparing BKZ and GSA for MCMC

GSA is relatively accurate but how does this affect the MCMC complexity?



- ▶ Error increases with $1/s$
- ▶ Relatively small error, especially for $x \leq 1/4$
- ▶ Hard to extrapolate to $n = 1000$ without BKZ simulators

Tentative conclusion for MCMC complexity

GSA introduces only a minor relative error, especially for $s \gg \text{vol}(L)^{1/n}$.

Theorem (Simplified)

For a BKZ- β basis under the GSA, $s > 0$ and any $p \in \{1, 3, \dots\}$,

$$\log \prod_{i=1}^n \rho_{\|\tilde{\mathbf{b}}_i\|/s}(\mathbb{Z}) \leq \log A + \sum_{\ell=1}^p X_\ell$$

where

$$A = \left(\frac{\sqrt{\|\tilde{\mathbf{B}}\|}}{s} \right)^{k_\beta}, \quad k_\beta \approx \frac{\ln \|\tilde{\mathbf{B}}\| - \ln s}{\ln H_\beta} \quad X_\ell = \text{corrective term}$$




- ▶ A is trivial to compute, **good formula for intuitions**
- ▶ X_ℓ ugly but cheap to compute and quickly get smaller as $\ell \rightarrow \infty$
- ▶ $p = 3$ gives **almost perfect** approximation (next slide)

Comparing GSA and the approximation formula




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$\log_2(\text{MCMC+GSA complexity}) :$



$\log_2((\times)) - \log_2(\text{MCMC+GSA complexity}) :$






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


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




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


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Application: dual attack on LWE

[PS24] describes a dual attack on LWE using [WL19] as Gaussian sampler.

Needs to **optimize** the choice of parameters (e.g. β , s):

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- ▶ instead uses a crude but fast approximation
- ▶ \rightsquigarrow **limits** how low s can be chosen

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Contribution: revisit [PS24] using our approximation formula

- better approximation \rightsquigarrow less constraints on s
- unlocks better choices of parameters (next slide)

Dual attack on LWE: estimates

Scheme	No modulus switching		With modulus switching	
	This paper	[PS24]	This paper	[PS24]
Kyber512	182	185	141	141
Kyber768	267	273	201	202
Kyber1024	366	376	273	279

Take away

Nontrivial improvement in the complexity

In the paper: further improvements by doing a smarter parameter search

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GSA/BKZ approximation error

Recall: error increases with $x = \text{vol}(L)^{1/n}/s$.

Dual attack only uses $x \leq 0.1 \rightsquigarrow$ approx error expected to be small.

Conclusion and future work

Complexity analysis of the MCMC sampler [WL19] for **BKZ-reduced basis**:

- ▶ Comparison between actual BKZ and GSA
- ▶ Upper bound/approximation formula for MCMC+GSA
- ▶ Comparison between MCMC+GSA and formula

Application to dual attack on LWE

Also in the paper: analysis of $\eta_\varepsilon(L)$ for random q -ary lattices L



Divesh Aggarwal, Yanlin Chen, Rajendra Kumar, and Yixin Shen.
Improved (provable) algorithms for the shortest vector problem via bounded distance decoding.

In Markus Bläser and Benjamin Monmege, editors, *38th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, STACS 2021, March 16-19, 2021, Saarbrücken, Germany (Virtual Conference)*, volume 187 of *LIPICs*, pages 4:1–4:20. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2021.



Zvika Brakerski, Adeline Langlois, Chris Peikert, Oded Regev, and Damien Stehlé.

Classical hardness of learning with errors.

In *Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC '13*, page 575–584, New York, NY, USA, 2013. Association for Computing Machinery.



Shi Bai, Damien Stehlé, and Weiqiang Wen.

Measuring, simulating and exploiting the head concavity phenomenon in bkz.

In *Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2018: 24th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Brisbane, QLD, Australia, December 2–6, 2018, Proceedings, Part I*, page 369–404, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2018. Springer-Verlag.



Craig Gentry, Chris Peikert, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan.

Trapdoors for hard lattices and new cryptographic constructions.

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Amaury Pouly and Yixin Shen.

Provable dual attacks on learning with errors.

In *Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2024: 43rd Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Zurich, Switzerland, May 26–30, 2024, Proceedings, Part VII*, page 256–285, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2024. Springer-Verlag.



Zheng Wang and Cong Ling.

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IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 65(6):3630–3645, 2019.